vibeflow-n8n/docs/release-audit.md

Release audit — v0.8.0

Date: 2026-07-22

Decision

APTO COM RESSALVAS for the first public executable release.

No blocking defect remains in the reviewed static-analysis boundary. The remaining caveats require runtime or node-specific knowledge that an exported JSON gate cannot prove.

QA evidence

• 26 automated tests pass, including one safe and one intentionally unsafe workflow.
• The safe fixture produces zero findings; the unsafe fixture produces VF001-VF009.
• Text, JSON, and SARIF output paths are exercised.
• Node 20, 22, and 24 are required in CI; local verification used the available Node runtime and the remote matrix is the release gate.
• JSON/YAML parsing, package dry-run, official skill/plugin validators, npm audit, and git diff --check are part of the final gate.

Red Team

The first implementation was rejected. Regression tests now cover the reproduced bypasses:

• declared webhook authentication without the matching credential reference;
• literal secrets in raw headers, URLs, expressions, pinned data, and static data;
• disconnected, nominal, or non-gating idempotency controls;
• parallel AI paths that bypass a kill switch, inverted or constant conditions, and decorative Code/NoOp nodes;
• resource connections misread as control flow and fabricated connection shapes;
• disconnected or cyclic error handling;
• read-only HTTP requests mislabeled as handoff;
• excessive or non-numeric timeouts and unsafe retry settings;
• policy weakening from an untrusted checkout;
• terminal-control injection, deep JSON, excessive nodes/edges/files/config terms, finding amplification, and quadratic traversal.

At the 5,000-node limit, the corrected linear traversal completed the synthetic chain in tens of milliseconds on the development machine. Finding truncation always adds blocking VF000.

Supply chain

• GitHub-owned actions are pinned to full verified commit SHAs.
• Checkout credentials are not persisted; workflow permissions are contents: read.
• Jobs have a ten-minute timeout and package installation ignores scripts.
• The package has no runtime dependencies and uses a publish allowlist.
• The bundled action always enables --locked.

The first merge SHA must replace mutable self-references in the README and Codex skill before the release tag is created.

Residual limitations

• Static analysis cannot prove a referenced credential exists or works.
• SQL and IF checks are high-confidence structural evidence, not runtime execution proofs.
• An HTTP POST labeled as a ticket or handoff may still fail or target the wrong service.
• Unknown community nodes may require a new side-effect adapter and regression fixture.
• Repository owners must still review changes to the CI workflow itself.

The official Codex Security workspace was opened, but its setup was never submitted through the app interface; no result from that scanner is claimed here. The release decision is based on the direct QA, independent Red Team, supply-chain review, and regression evidence above.